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Comments  and 
Discussion 
Willim  Poole: Mislikin's  paper provides a thorough examination  of 
efficient-markets  theory and many useful ideas on its implications  for 
macro models and monetary  policy. His empirical  results  replicate  and 
extend  previous  work  on efficient  markets.  His work  is careful  and thor- 
ough. As far as I can see from  reading  the paper,  he has been extremely 
careful  in his treatment  of the data and in his statistical  analysis. 
Mishkin's  empirical  work uncovers  only one puzzle. In equation  29, 
when he regresses  the return  from holding  common  stocks on the three- 
month treasury  bill rate, he finds a negative  coefficient  rather  than the 
positive one predicted  by the theory. The efficient-markets  model, of 
course, predicts that, except for differences  in returns  due to risk and 
liquidity  premiums,  returns  should  be equalized  on all assets;  but Mish- 
kin's  equation  comes  up with the result  that  when  the treasury  bill rate  is 
high,  the rate  of return  expected  on stocks  is low. 
To understand  that equation, suppose that the bill rate is relatively 
high at 8 percent.  The quarterly  rate of return  on bills in decimal  form  is 
then 0.02. A bill rate of 0.02 times the regression  coefficient  of about 
-5.0  is -0.10.  Add to this figure  the constant  term in the equation  of 
0.08, and a per  quarter  expected  return  is obtained  from  holding  common 
stocks of -0.02,  or -8  percent  per year. Similarly,  when the bill rate is 
relatively  low-say  4 percent  per year or 0.01 per quarter-the expected 
return  on common  stock is 0.03 per quarter  or 12 percent  at an annual 
rate. 
The puzzle  is how the expected  return  on common  stocks  can be nega- 
tive when treasury  bills earing  a positive rate of return  can always  be 
held. A possible explanation  for this result depends  on the existence  of 
transactions  costs. The time series of changes in the bill rate displays 
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negative  serial dependence.  Therefore,  whenever  the bill rate is abnor- 
mally high, say, 8 percent,  the rate is on average  expected  to fall in the 
future.  The expected  return  from holding  bills for two quarters-either 
one six-month  bill or two successive  three-month  bills-will  be less than 
the abnormally  high three-month  bill rate  of 8 percent.  Because  of trans- 
actions  costs, it is not profitable  to sell stocks at time t -  1 with the ex- 
pectation  of buying  stocks  at time  t when  the one-quarter  return  on stocks 
between  t and t +  1 is expected  to be higher.  Transactions  costs of trad- 
ing common stocks require  that the planned holding period be longer 
than  three  months. 
If this argument  is correct,  running  the equation  on semiannual  rather 
than quarterly  data should  yield a larger  regression  coefficient.  Perhaps 
the coefficient  would still be negative  but not as much  as in the quarterly 
regression.  Indeed, under this argument,  the longer the holding period 
analyzed,  the closer  the coefficient  should  come to 1.0. I have no way of 
knowing  whether  the transactions  costs explanation  is correct,  but it is at 
least a possible  explanation  for the  puzzling  outcome. 
The implications  of Mishkin's  results  for macro models are brought 
out most clearly  in his table 1. Consider,  for example,  the predicted  re- 
turn  from  holding  bonds  with a 20 percent  return  per year  for the fourth 
quarter  of 1976 calculated  from the term-structure  equation  using the 
forward  rate measure  of expectations.  This relatively  high return  indi- 
cates that the term-structure  equation  predicted  bond prices  would rise, 
or bond  interest  rates  would  fall, over  the quarter. 
Mishkin  interprets  this result  as showing  that  the term-structure  equa- 
tion is deficient.  If we were  to examine  the term-structure  equation  resid- 
ual at the end of such a quarter,  then,  he argues,  we should  see the actual 
interest  rate on bonds higher  than that predicted  by the term-structure 
equation.  The realized  bill rate at the end of the quarter  may differ  from 
the forward  bill rate  prevailing  at the beginning  of the quarter;  but if the 
forward  rate is an unbiased  forecast,  then on average  in such situations 
the term-structure  residual  at the end of the quarter  should err as indi- 
cated. This proposition  could be tested by seeing if the end-of-quarter 
residual  of the term-structure  equation  that is predicted  at the beginning 
of the quarter  by the efficient-markets  model in fact is positively  related 
to the realized  residual. 
According  to the argument  just discussed,  an observation  such as that 
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tion for the interest  rate  on bonds  at the end of the quarter  that  is too low. 
But it is also possible  that  the term-structure  prediction  for the end of the 
quarter  is correct  and that the problem  is that the bond interest  rate at 
the beginning  of the quarter  is erratically  high because,  for example,  of 
heavy placements  of new bond issues. This proposition  would be sup- 
ported  by evidence  that the volume  of new placements,  or trading  activ- 
ity, or some other variable  known at the beginning  of the quarter  could 
explain the high expected  yield over the quarter.  It would also be sup- 
ported  by evidence  that the term-structure  prediction  for the end of the 
quarter  calculated  from information  available at the beginning  of the 
quarter  is a more accurate  predictor  than is the efficient-markets  model. 
Mishkin's evidence, as well as that of  Phillips and Pippenger in 
the paper cited by Mishkin,  does not support the second possibility. 
Mishkin  did not test for all possible variables,  such as trading  volume, 
that might conceivably  be related to the bond interest rate, but he is 
hardly  to be faulted for not playing this game. There is an indefinitely 
large  number  of such variables  and, without  hypotheses  as to which  var- 
iables might  appear,  he would have to engage  in a fishing  expedition  of 
the worst sort. His purpose  was not to find such variables  but to show 
that the standard  term-structure  equation cannot be adequate.  If the 
bond interest  rate really is affected  by the volume of new placements, 
then that  variable  should  be added  to the term-structure  equation. 
Having  said all this, and agreeing  with Mishkin's  basic  point, I should 
add that the errors  of the term-structure  equation  may not be serious. 
Assuming  that  the 20 percent  expected  return  in table 1 reflects  an excess 
return  of 15 percentage  points, the term-structure  equation  is generating 
a prediction  of the bond yield that is in error  by about 40 basis points. 
Such an error  is not trivial,  but it does not seem catastrophic.  Investment 
equations  are  not so sensitive  to the long-term  interest  rate  that  missing  it 
by 40 basis points-especially  if the miss does not last too long-will 
have a major effect on a model's  GNP predictions.  If I were a model 
builder  and expected that future  monetary  and fiscal policies would be 
fairly  similar  to those of the past, I suspect  that  Mishkin's  table 1 might 
convince me to leave the term-structure  equation  alone and to concen- 
trate my efforts on other problem areas, such as the money-demand 
equation. 
Mishkin's  analysis  of the term structure  makes  it clear that the equa- 
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monetary  and fiscal policies that are fundamentally  different  from the 
policies  in force  over  the period  of estimation.  His discussion  of the policy 
implications  of the efficient-markets  model elaborates  on the story. 
Mishkin  argues  that lags in policy effects should be shorter  than the 
lags predicted  by standard  econometric  models;  indeed,  in the efficient- 
markets  model  there  can be no lag at all in financial  markets  because  new 
information,  including  that  of a policy change,  is immediately  reflected  in 
changes  in securities  prices. The magnitude  of the effects  of changes  in 
monetary  policy on securities  prices  will exceed that  of the standard  pre- 
diction when changes  in policy are perceived  as permanent,  and will be 
smaller  when  the policy changes  are  expected  to be especially  temporary. 
A substantial  money stock bulge that is expected to be reversed  may 
affect  the bill rate  but should  not affect  the long-term  bond  yield as much 
as the standard  term-structure  equation  predicts.  The key point is that 
the impact  of a policy change  in a particular  quarter  cannot be deter- 
mined  without  specifying  expectations  conceming  future  policy. 
Mishkin  draws some conclusions  that appear  to contain both good 
news and bad news. I see only the bad news. Suppose  policymakers  ob- 
serve  bond rates changing  by more than predicted  by the term-structure 
equation.  How can  they  possibly  know  whether  the change  reflects  market 
expectations  concerning  future  monetary  policy or some other  factor? I 
submit  that, without  direct  and reliable  data on expectations,  there  is no 
way to sort out expectational  factors  from other  factors,  including  those 
reflecting  policy  changes. 
At the end of the paper  Mishkin  seems to be struggling  to maint 
that macroeconometric  models are of some value although  not as much 
value as previously  thought. His last sentence reads: "Incorporating 
efficient-markets  theory into macroeconomics  does not lessen the need 
for policy-oriented  and basic research,  but it does require  some redirec- 
tion of thinking."  Of course,  the efficient-markets  theory  does not lessen 
the need for policy-oriented  research,  but it does require  more than 
"some  redirection"  of our thinking.  I would have preferred  that Mishkin 
end with another  sentence  that appears  early  in his paper: ". . . efficient- 
markets  theory  implies  that  the macroeconometric  models  currently  used 
for policy analysis  and forecasting  are deficient  in a fundamental  way." 
Until a way is found to incorporate  in econometric  models the expecta- 
tions of economic  agents  about  the future  course  of policy, we should  be 
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effects  of alternative  policies.  The problem  is fundamental  and  it requires 
more  than  a minor  redirection  of our  macro  analysis. 
Franco  Modigliani:  According  to Mishkin,  his paper  is intended  to show 
"that  current  procedures  for evaluating  policy  and  forecasting  with  macro- 
econometric  models are inconsistent  with market  efficiency  in bond and 
stock markets"  and that "incorporating  efficient-markets  theory into 
macroeconomi  . . . does require  some redirection  of thinking."  In my 
view,  both  these  conclusions  are  unwarranted  and  reflect  a basic  confusion 
between  explaining  a variable  and forecasting  its change as well as be- 
tween  conditional  and unconditional  forecasting. 
The objection  to the "current  procedures"  is that  the equations  used  in 
existing  models explain  such financial  variables  as the stock market  and 
the long-term  interest  rate, and their  change,  as a function  of past "pub- 
licly available  information."  Such a formulation  is supposedly  inconsis- 
tent with "efficient-markets  theory"  because  according  to the theory,  the 
change  in these variables  must be uncorrelated  with past publicly  avail- 
able  information.  My first  concern  will be to show that  this  line of reason- 
ing is faulty-it  must be because one of the equations  criticized  is the 
Modigliani-Shiller  term-structure  equation, which relies squarely on 
efficient-markets  theory. 
To begin,  neither  stock nor bond yields are, strictly  speaking,  martin- 
gales, and this holds a fortiori  for the value of equity  and the bond rate 
(see below). But forget  this  technicality  for the moment  and  assume  that, 
say, the market  value  of equity  is a variable  with  the property  that  its per- 
centage  change  is a martingale.  It should  be obvious  to an economist  that 
this single  property  cannot  and does not provide  an explanation  of what 
determines  or explains  that market  value. If we try to understand  its de- 
terminants,  we wil be led to such variables  as the expectations  of future 
profits  and of future  interest  rates. And each of these expectations  will 
clearly  be shaped,  in large  measure,  by the past  history  of profits,  interest 
rates, and other  variables.  Thus the market  value of stock will finally  be 
explained  by current  and past profits,  interest  rates,  and so on. Similarly, 
the bond rate  will depend  on expectations  of future  short-term  rates  and 
risk  premIums,  which  will be influenced  by current  and  past  interest  rates, 
inflation,  and so on. 
But then the change  in market  value, because  it is the difference  be- 
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only, must be a function  of current  and past values  of publicly  available 
information.  Mishkin  would  want  us to believe  that this conclusion  must 
be rejected  because,  by efficient-markets  theory,  that change  is a martin- 
gale and  hence  cannot  be correlated  with  past  values.  Intuition  tells  us that 
his reasoning  must  be in error  because  dependence  on the past  and (near) 
martingale  properties  of the change  are such obvious  characteristics  of a 
variable  like the market  value  of equity  that  there  should  not be a need  for 
choosing  between  them.  And indeed,  one can readily  show that there  is 
no inconsistency. 
The easiest  way to convince  Mishkin  and  the reader  is to rely  on Mish- 
kin's  own equations  and  tests.  Mishkin  has assured  us that  the bond  yield 
series  passes  the test of a martingale.  Yet his equation  35 shows  that the 
yield depends  on the current  short-term  rate and a measure  of the "ex- 
pected  rate"  for period  t, ERAR,, which  according  to equation  20 is given 
by a distributed  lag of past short-term  rates,  much as it was in the Modi- 
gliani and Shiller  model (even though  Mishkin's  equation  is not a very 
sensible  one). Thus substituting  20 into 35 shows  that  the yield is a func- 
tion of the current  and lagged  short-term  interest  rates. Furthermore,  if 
we solve the yield equation  for the bond rate, this rate will be found to 
depend  on the lagged  bond rate and on these short-term  interest  rates. 
And if the lagged  long-term  rate  is eliminated  by recursively  expressing  it 
in terms  of previous  long- and short-term  rates,  one ends up with a form 
similar  to that of Modigliani  and Shiller,  in which the long-term  rate is 
explained  by a long distributed  lag of the short-term  rate alone. 
Similarly,  from 36 we find  that  the stock  return-and hence  to a close 
approximation  the change  in market  value  and  the market  value  itself-is 
a function  of the current  and  lagged  long rate,  and  the equation  at the top 
of table 4 suggests  that it depends  also on the bond rate lagged many 
periods.  Furthermore,  the MPS  equation,  as well as some  work  in which  I 
am presently  engaged,  suggests  that the equation  of table 4 leaves out 
many other relevant  current  and past variables.  To conclude,  then, the 
fact that a variable  has the characteristic  that  its first  difference  is a mar- 
tingale  in no way excludes  the possibility  that it, as well as its first  differ- 
ence,  may  be a function  of current  variables  and  variables  with  substantial 
lags. 
Because  this conclusion  may appear  puzzling  in the light of Mishkin's 
paper  and has generated  so much confusion,  it may merit  some further 
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by noting that the martingale  property  does not exclude the possibility 
that the first  difference  (and hence  the level) is a function  of current  and 
past variables,  since the only restriction  required  for a martingale  is that 
the first  difference  should  not be correlated  with  past  variables  in a regres- 
sion that excludes all current  variables.  Indeed, as can be seen from 
tables 3 and 4, once the current  variable  is dropped (RTB in table 3; 
RCB in table  4), neither  bond  nor stock  yields  are  significantly  correlated 
with past variables. 
Quite  generally  if S is a variable  for which  AS  is a martingale,  and  f() 
is a proposed  "explanation"  of S (S = f ( *  ) + u, where  u is an error  term), 
the condition  that  the explanation  is consistent  with the martingale  prop- 
erty of S is not that f( *  ) contains  no lagged arguments  but merely  that 
Af(  )  itself (and, similarly,  Au) is a martingale.  This result can be 
illustrated  with  reference  to the  Modigliani-Shiller  model  of the long-term 
rate.  In this  model  the long-term  rate  is a (weighted) average  of expected 
future  rates,  which  the market  is assumed  to forecast  from  the past  history 
of short-term  rates,  inflation,  and  so on. This  formulation  implies  that  the 
change  in the long-term  rate can be expressed,  as in Mishkin's  equations 
20 and 35, as the sum  of two components.  The first  is systematic  and an- 
ticipated  and reflects  the capital  gain appropriate  to insure  that the ex- 
pected  holding  yield is equal  to the short-term  rate  plus the risk  premium. 
The second  reflects  the difference  between  the expectation  of future  rates 
held now and the expectation  held in the last period.  That difference  be- 
tween two functions,  each of which involves many past variables,  turns 
out to be a martingale.  It is in fact determined  by the difference  between 
the actual short-term  rate in the current  period and the forecast  of that 
rate  made  in the previous  period,  a forecast  error  that,  by construction,  is 
uncorrelated  with  the past  history  of interest  rates,  inflation,  and  so forth. 
The specific  equation  assumed  to generate  the expectations  of future  rates 
used by Modigliani  and  Shiller  is quite  different  from  Mishkin's,  and  while 
I do not know whether  it performs  better,  I suspect  that at least it was 
thought  out more  carefully,  allowing  among  other  things  for the effects  of 
inflation. 
This clarification  of the Modigliani-Shiller  structure  is also helpful  in 
understanding  why  the  laborious  exercise  carried  out  by Mishkin  in table  1 
to discredit  the Modigliani-Shiller  approach  basically  misses the point. 
Rather  than use the Modigliani-Shiller  equation,  Mishkin  estimates  an- 
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regards  the role of inflation  and  has unacceptable  steady-state  properties. 
(The sum of the interest  coefficients  is 1.3.) But what is most serious  is 
that,  to obtain  the predicted  bond  rate  of the next period  needed  to calcu- 
late his expected  yield, he substitutes  in the bond-rate  equation  15 or 16 
an independently  obtained  forecast  of the short-term  rate for the next 
period.  This  procedure  is unwarranted  because  a forecast  of the short-term 
rate for the next period  is already  embedded  in a properly  specified  and 
estimated  Modigliani-Shiller  equation,  and that forecast  is the only one 
that is consistent  with that equation.  More precisely,  the yield expecta- 
tions implied  by the Modigliani-Shiller  framework  are neither  the figures 
of the first  column  nor those of the second column  of table 1, but rather 
are those in the third column plus the risk premium  (which itself is a 
variable  in the Modigliani-Shiller  equation). From this yield one can 
infer the expected  bond rate for the next period implied  by the model, 
and hence, finally,  the expected  short-term  rate. 
Thus the only meaningful  exercise Mishkin could have carried  out 
would have been to compare  the expectation  of the next short-term  rate 
implied  by his equation  20 with that implied  by his version  of the Modi- 
gliani-Shiller  equation,  although  I doubt  that even this exercise  would  be 
worthwhile  given his cavalier  reestimate  of the Modigliani-Shiller  equa- 
tion. Note finally  that  his huge and  extremely  volatile  yields are  perfectly 
consistent  with the relatively  small difference  in the expected  short-term 
rates of the next period,  because  these yields are about 40 times larger 
than  the difference  between  the current  and  expected  bond  rate. 
Mishkin's  discussion  of economic  model forecasting  illustrates  his in- 
ability  to appreciate  the distinction  between  the requirements  of uncondi- 
tional  forecasts  and those of conditional  forecasts,  which  are  relevant  for 
agents  who  may  possess (or believe  that  they  possess) superior  knowledge 
of relevant  future  variables,  or who, like the government,  may  be in a po- 
sition  to influence  those  variables.  For a person  having  no special  informa- 
tion or control  over  the  future,  the  best  forecast  of the next  value  of a vari- 
able  S with martingale  properties  is clearly  the current  value (up to some 
constant).  The knowledge that St can be explained by f(xt,  xtl,  .  .  ) 
would be of little value to him because St+, depends on xt+i,  which he 
cannot  predict  any more accurately  than the forecast  already  implicit  in 
St. It is, presumably,  in this spirit that Mishkin suggests that build- 
ers of econometric  models might  wish to adopt his equation  40, which 
states  that the bond rate  from  here on is equal to today's  bond rate  plus Frederic  S. Mishkin  761 
an unexplainable  error.  But this  equation  is clearly  worse  than  useless  for 
policymakers-it is actually  misleading  because  it implies  that the long- 
term rate would be unaffected  by anything  his policy might do to the 
short-term  rate. 
What  the policymaker  needs to know for evaluating  policy is whether 
and how S might  respond  to some variable  x that he controls  directly  or 
that  he might  affect  through  other  policies.  Policymakers,  therefore,  need 
an estimate  of the function  f because,  if St actually  does depend  on xt, 
then AS is not a martingale.  Hence I would confidently  predict that, 
despite  Mishkin's  plea, econometric  model builders  will not (and should 
not) adopt his equation  40. They will instead  appropriately  continue  to 
endeavor  to establish  what actually  determines  S-martingale or not- 
and  in particular  how it responds  to policy  variables. 
Mishkin's  analysis  does offer  something  more  constructive  than equa- 
tion 40 to the policymaker.  For instance,  34 can provide  an estimate  of 
the response  of the long-term  rate to a contemporaneous  change  in the 
short-term  rate; even better, 35, together  with 20, makes it possible to 
estimate  a whole future  path of the bond rate as a function  of the future 
path of the short-term  rate. Before accepting  these estimates  the user 
would be well advised to compare  the quality of conditional  forecasts 
produced  by these equations  with that  of other  existing  formulations. 
I am happy  to report  that there  is one issue on which  I find  myself  in 
agreement  with  Mishkin,  though  it is not a new issue, nor,  by now, a par- 
ticularly  controversial  one. It is the proposition  that the coefficients  of 
equations  explaining  a financial  variable  like the value of equity  or the 
long-term  rate may not remain  stable  over long periods  of time. Indeed, 
such  variables  are  in the nature  of long-term  purchase  or rental  contracts, 
whose  value,  at any  point  of time,  must  of necessity  reflect  expectations  of 
future  variables  over  long periods  of time. (The fact that  for highly  liquid 
assets  the return  is fully determined  by the expected  value of the asset at 
the next  point  in time  does not change  this conclusion  because  the current 
expectation  of the next-period  value depends  on the expectation  of vari- 
ables  beyond  that  period.) Therefore,  in attempting  to explain  such  finan- 
cial variables,  one must somehow  model expectations  that can only de- 
pend on current  and past variables.  But clearly the parameters  of such 
expectational  relationships  do not reflect  unchanging  technological  laws 
or even tastes;  such  parameters  might  be more  appropriately  described  as 
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ments  and the public's  perception  of the way in which  policymakers  may 
be expected  to respond  to evolving  events.  Accordingly,  such coefficients 
are  in principle  subject  to gradual  or sudden  change,  and  may,  in particu- 
lar, vary  with major  changes  in policy rules  or policy styles. Contrary  to 
what  one might  infer  from  Mishkin  and  some  of the literature  on rational 
expectations,  the instability  of the relevant  parameters  is not an inexor- 
able law of nature,  but merely  a possibility  depending  on circumstances 
and subject  to empirical  verification.  In the case of the Modigliani-Shiller 
term-structure  equation, for example, the evidence suggests that the 
underlying  expectational  mechanism  has  been  quite  stable.  Thus  the equa- 
tion fitted  to the period  from 1954 to 1966 for the MPS model has been 
found  to perform  remarkably  well for the next ten years. 
At the same  time, anyone  using  the equation  must  be on guard  for cir- 
cumstances  likely  to result  in a change  in structure;  for instance,  an event 
like the introduction  of price and wage controls,  as in 1971, would call 
into question  whether  price expectations  could continue  to be approxi- 
mated  by the same distributed  lag of past inflation,  and at the very least 
would suggest  an increase  in the margin  of error  of the equation.  Simi- 
larly, suppose the Federal Reserve were to engage in an entirely  new 
(and preposterous)  policy  of announcing  a change  in the  treasury  bill rate 
to be maintained  forever  (something  which,  of course,  could  be done  only 
once in history  and  if there  were  strong  reason  for believing  that  the pub- 
lic would be gullible  enough  to believe it). Then any sensible  forecaster 
asked  to predict  the consequences  of such  a policy  would  run  precisely  the 
simulation  that  Mishkin  has  performed  and  which  for some  curious  reason 
he likes to label "efficient-markets  simulation."  I would  bet that the typi- 
cal model builder  would have such a simulation  already  in his drawer 
because  he has  to analyze  the dynamic  characteristics  of his model  system, 
and thus  he is likely  to have simulated  at some time or other  the response 
of that  system  to a change  in the long rate. 
Despite  all my criticism,  I feel that  we should  all be grateful  to Mishkin 
for a provocative  paper  that has forced us to think through  and clarify 
some of the apparent  puzzles  associated  with efficient-markets  theory.  I, 
at least, feel much more confident  after this exercise that the efficient- 
markets theory will not require much significant  redirection  of  my 
thinking. 
Frederic  S. Mishkin:  There  really  is less disagreement  between  my view 
and Franco  Modigliani's  than may first  appear.  Modigliani  is quite  right Frederic S. Mishkin  763 
that  efficient-markets  theory  does not imply  that  a long-term  security's  re- 
turn (or, almost  equivalently,  the change  in its market  value) is unrelated 
to current  and past values  of a variable  such as interest  rates.  Yet it does 
imply  that the security's  excess return  is uncorrelated  with past informa- 
tion, taken  alone. This is clearly  brought  out in the paper  in the efficient- 
markets  model  of equation  21 and  its empirical  counterparts,  34-36. The 
efficient-markets  model states that the return on a long-term  security 
(neglecting  possible movements  in the equilibrium  return) should be 
correlated  only with surprises,  or more precisely,  with the deviations  of 
actual values from the optimal  forecasts,  X,  -  XI. However, as is the 
case in 34-36, these surprises  can be estimated  as a function  of current 
and past variables.  Indeed,  35, where  the bond return  is a distributed  lag 
of current  and  past short-term  interest  rates,  is totally  consistent  with  the 
view inherent in  the  Modigliani-Shiller  term-structure  equation. Of 
course, that might  have been expected  because  Modigliani  and Shiller's 
seminal  paper  provides  important  evidence  that lends support  to bond- 
market  efficiency. 
What  is of critical  importance  to macroeconomic  analysis  in this  paper 
is the idea  that,  as an approximation,  only surprises  influence  the valuation 
of long-term  securities.  This in no way denies  the usefulness  of searching 
out the factors that influence  the prices of these securities.  The Modi- 
gliani-Shiller  term-structure  equation,  as well as dissimilar  ones (such as 
35 of this paper), provide information  that a policymaker  would find 
valuable,  indicating  how long-term  rates react to a surprising  change  in 
short-term  rates.  Even when financial  market  efficiency  is imposed  on a 
macro  model, this allows  us to ask the question:  what  effect  on the econ- 
omy results  from certain  shocks?  There are simulation  methods  for ex- 
ploring this type of question that are consistent  with financial  market 
efficiency,  and they are applied  in the paper  cited in note 53. 
What market  efficiency  tells us, however, is that we must be quite 
careful  in our use of macroeconometric  models and that policymaking 
might  be a trickier  business  than is sometimes  conceded.  The following 
problem  arises.  Even if estimated  equations  predict  that a surprise  shock 
to a variable  such as the short-term  interest  rate will have a particular 
effect on long-term  rates and hence on the economy, the policymaker 
cannot  assume  that,  when  he applies  a shock  to this variable,  it will auto- 
matically  lead  to the predicted  effect.  The actual  effect  of the policy  action 
will depend on market expectations,  and the policymaker  should be 
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This paper  also criticizes  the use of term-structure  equations  for fore- 
casting.  The experiments  in table 1 tell a simple  story.  The existence  of 
error terms in term-structure  equations indicates that the market, in 
making  forecasts,  uses information  beyond that included  in these equa- 
tions. In fact, some of this information  is probably  so subjective  that it 
cannot be included in an econometric  specification.  Since these term- 
structure  equations  must  neglect  this type of information  that  is available 
to the market,  their  forecasts  may be suboptimal.  It is in this sense that 
such  forecasts  are  inconsistent  with  market  efficiency,  and this is why the 
results  in table 1 should  not be surprising.  William  Poole's calculation  of 
the magnitudes  implied  by table 1 for the difference  between  the efficient- 
markets  forecasts  and  those from  the term-structure  equation  are reason- 
ably  accurate;  and  he is justified  in saying  that,  from  a forecasting  point  of 
view, other  sectors  of macroeconometric  models  may have more serious 
deficiencies.  On the other  hand,  using  an alternative  procedure  consistent 
with market  efficiency  might  be worthwhile  because it is so cheap and 
easy. One extremely  crude  alternative  is the approximation  of 40, where 
the future  long-term  rate  is predicted  to be unchanged  from today's  rate. 
Note, however,  that this paper never suggests  that an equation  like 40 
should be used in a simulation  context;  that use would contradict  the 
theoretical  perspective  that both efficient-markets  theory  and this paper 
put  forward. 
The time and effort spent in analyzing  the implications  of efficient- 
markets  theory  has led me, at least, to redirect  much of my thinking.  I 
agree  with William  Poole that the problems  that market  efficiency  poses 
for macroeconometric  models are fundamental.  Efficient-markets  theory 
does require  a major  redirection  of macroeconomic  analysis. 
General  Discussion 
Robert  Hall found convincing  Mishkin's  argument  that, although  the 
standard  term-structure  equation  could predict the effects of a typical 
policy  measure,  it was inadequate  for forecasting  the effects  of a particular 
policy  action,  especially  the effects  of an  innovative  one. He stressed,  how- 
ever, that  Mishkin  had failed to provide  an alternative  way of closing  the 
model  when a policy innovation  occurred.  Hall noted  that  one procedure Frederic  S. Mishkin  765 
was to use the short-term  rates  predicted  by the model itself to generate 
long-term  rates  consistent  with rational  expectations. 
William  Branson  and Rudiger  Dornbusch  traced  the steps  required,  in 
principle,  to predict  the effects of a particular  policy action. First, one 
needs to model the expected or endogenous  policy response;  next, the 
"surprise"  in policy can be calculated  as the difference  between  the actual 
and expected  action;  finally,  a reaction  function  of the market  is needed 
to translate  the surprise  into altered  expectations  for the future.  Branson 
felt that Mishkin  was correct  in arguing  that major  innovations  in policy 
would  instantaneously  shift  the entire  yield curve  of interest  rates  through 
the reaction  function.  But he felt that standard  term-structure  equations 
were useful  shortcuts  for assessing  the effects  of routine  policy measures. 
Christopher  Sims  also saw  some  usefulness  of the standard  term-structure 
equations.  He pointed  out that,  since these  equations  are  specified  in level 
form,  they  give greater  weight  to long-frequency  changes,  which  are  perti- 
nent for tracking  the effects  of a policy change  over several  quarters.  He 
added, however, that for tests of market  efficiency,  the greater  weight 
given to the shorter  frequency  changes  in the first-difference  formulation 
might  be preferable. 
Michael  Wachter  believed  that, while the coefficients  were unlikely  to 
be stable,  people  would  change  their  expectations  about  policy only grad- 
ually.  Hence, the equations  would  be usable  although  they  would  need to 
be reestimated  from time to time. He also suggested  that Mishkin  might 
explore  how fast the coefficients  have changed  in response  to identifiable 
policy  changes  in historical  episodes. 
Martin  Baily felt that the paper had overemphasized  policy innova- 
tions and thus exaggerated  the inadequacy  of distributed  lags. Discre- 
tionary  monetary  policy has been applied  continuously  for a long time- 
sometimes  wisely, sometimes  badly, sometimes  surprisingly,  sometimes 
routinely.  The distributed  lag equations  that summarize  typical experi- 
ence should provide  a fair amount  of insight  on the economy's  response 
to policy. 
William  Poole countered  that optimal control solutions  derived  with 
the MPS model suggest  monetary  policies  that are  very  different  from  the 
way the Federal Reserve has actually  behaved.  Thus the historical  ex- 
perience  reflected  in the coefficients  of the model would not be suitable 
for forecasting  the effects  of an optimal  control  strategy  of policy. Poole 
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Baily also emphasized  that "expected"  policies had an effect before 
they were enacted:  they should  not be regarded  as ineffective.  Mishkin 
agreed  that efficient  markets  could make  policy more effective  by reflect- 
ing  expectations  about  policy  promptly. 
Benjamin  Friedman  noted that the paper and also the dialogue  be- 
tween Mishkin  and Modigliani  had focused on two alternative  ways of 
tracking  bond  interest  rates-the  term-structure  equation  with  distributed 
lags, and some variant  of a random  walk model. Friedman  pointed  out 
that a third  alternative  was the explicit  modeling  of supply  and demand 
for long-term  assets,  which, among  its other  virtues,  did not rely on the 
assumption  of a constant  liquidity  premium  or a constant  equilibrium 
return. 
A number  of other participants  expressed  their discomfort  with the 
assumption  of constancy  of the equilibrium  return,  and particularly  of 
the nominal  equilibrium  return.  Mishkin  responded  that  he did not estab- 
lish that the equilibrium  rate was constant  nor did he believe that the 
liquidity  premium  was constant.  He explained  that  he had conducted  the 
tests reported  in the text assuming  constancy  as a simplification.  The re- 
sults of the tests are not significantly  affected  so long as the variation  in 
the equilibrium  rate of return  is small relative  to other sources  of varia- 
tion. He noted that some of his equations  implied  that the equilibrium 
changes  amounted  to less than 2 percent  of the total variation  in bond 
retums and additional  tests that allowed  the equilibrium  return  to vary 
with the short-term  interest  rate did not lead to appreciably  different 
results. 
Brainard  had another  problem  with  the concept  of equilibrium  applied 
in the paper.  He thought  it necessary  to distinguish  between  movements 
in interest  rates  that  were  required  to maintain  an equilibrium  configura- 
tion among yields and movements  that established  a new equilibrium 
following  some shock. The "paradoxical"  negative  relationship  between 
various  short-term  interest  rates and the stock market  yield may simply 
reflect  the fact that an increase,  say, in short-term  interest  rates,  requires 
a decrease  in stock prices to establish  a new equilibrium  in which the 
expected return  from stocks is higher. Given discrete sample periods, 
these adjustments  to equilibrium  complicate  the estimation  of the equi- 
librium  relationships  among  asset returns.  He also argued  that the anal- 
ysis ought to try to identify the cause of such shifts-for  example, a 
change in inflationary  expectations,  a change in  the marginal  rate of Frederic  S. Mishkin  767 
time preference,  or a change  in expected  profits  or taxes-because  var- 
ious types of  disturbances  require different revaluation  of  assets to 
restore  equilibrium. 
Mishkin's  simulation  experiment  with the MPS model provoked  con- 
siderable  discussion.  Sims criticized  the implicit  assumption  that policy- 
makers  could  control  people's  perceptions  and  expectations  in such  a way 
as to convince them immediately  of the permanence  of any particular 
change in interest  rates. In fact, a major uncertainty  about any policy 
action  is how it will affect  expectations,  and neither  the policymaker  nor 
the outside analyst can legitimately  rule out that problem  by assump- 
tion. Sims also indicated  that, once the equation  determining  the long- 
term interest  rate in the MPS model  was changed,  other  equations  in the 
model also had to be altered.  For example,  investment  is linked to the 
long-term  interest  rate in the model. Although short-term  interest  rates 
also influence  investment,  their  effect  is normally  picked  up by the long- 
term rate. But in Mishkin's  illustrative  simulation,  the long-term  rate 
changes by an unusually  large amount  relative to the short-term  rate, 
and hence the change  in investment  calculated  from the model is likely 
to be exaggerated. 
Robert Gordon saw other related problems in the simulation.  He 
stressed  that  a surprising  drop  in the short-term  interest  rate  that  reflected 
an unusually expansionary  monetary policy would have subsequent 
effects on both real activity and inflation  that tended to drive interest 
rates back upward.  Hence it seemed implausible  to him that any policy 
easing of that kind would be interpreted  in the market  as a permanent 
lowering  of interest  rates, regardless  of what the Federal Reserve said 
about its intentions.  Moreover,  he conjectured  that any big surprise  in 
Federal Reserve policy would be greeted  with disbelief in the market- 
place. Hence, market  participants  were unlikely  to conceive  of it as per- 
manent  and  indeed  might  translate  this change  in the short-term  rate  less 
significantly  and less rapidly  into long-term  rates. Gordon noted Mish- 
kin's finding  that, on average,  a surprise  in the short-term  rate of 100 
basis  points  is accompanied  by a change  in the long-term  rate of 36 basis 
points;  he doubted  that a very different  result  from that average  should 
be attributed  to any  particular  hypothetical  policy  action. 
Stephen  Goldfeld  was troubled  by another  feature  of the simulation.  It 
assumes  that  the expected  path  of interest  rates  is pulled  down  as a result 
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previously  expected. If some changes  in short-term  interest  rates were 
initially expected by market  participants,  the same changes are subse- 
quently  expected  but  from  a benchmark  level that  is 50 basis  points  lower. 
Such an alteration  of expectations  was, in Goldfeld's  view, "a strange 
animal." 
Mishkin  responded  that he was in general  agreement  with these com- 
ments that caution against  the reliability  of the simulation  results.  The 
simulation  experiments  in his paper  are  not intended  as a guide  to policy- 
makers,  but are  rather  an illustration  used to convey  the following  point: 
macroeconometric  models  that fail to impose  financial  market  efficiency 
tend to overstate  the lag in the effects  on aggregate  demand  of changes 
in short-term  interest  rates  resulting  from  monetary  policy. 